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Many firms recognize exceptional supplier performance by giving out a “Supplier of the Year” or “Outstand-
ing Supplier” award. These awards are usually symbolic since they have no immediate monetary value for
a supplier and no direct cost to a buyer. Giving these awards can be beneficial for a buyer: if a supplier’s
employees care about an award, symbolic awards can incentivize a supplier to exert higher effort. On the
other hand, in a market with multiple buyers and suppliers, an award may have another unintended effect,
which we denote “competition effect”. When an award is announced, other buyers are aware of which supplier
is particularly good. In a market where a good supplier is scarce, the award can increase a buyer’s cost of
building and maintaining a relationship with a good supplier. We develop a theoretical model that captures
a supplier’s value for the award in a setting with two buyers and two suppliers. We show that the average
provision of quality is higher when awards are available whether these are private (only observable to the
recipient) or public (observable to everyone). In addition, public awards result in buyers paying a higher price
to get a good supplier. We then test these results with a laboratory experiment. Our experimental results
show that private symbolic awards have incentive effects and lead to higher provision of quality and higher
buyer’s profits. When the awards are public this profit premium disappears. This happens for two reasons,
first because buyers have to pay higher prices to get the good suppliers, and second because making the
award public crowds out the intrinsic value of the award for suppliers. We also find that significant efficiency
gains occur only when the award is private and the quality is public. This suggests that symbolic awards
provide a noisy signal of a supplier’s type and therefore fail to capture the full efficiency gain of transparent
transactions.
Key words : collaboration in supply chains, behavioral operations, symbolic supplier awards
1. Introduction
One of the most important aspects of managing a good supply chain is to build and retain relation-
ships with suppliers as what suppliers do affects a firm and its customers. The field of operations
management has produced a vast literature in buyer-supplier relationships. Many papers in the
area study objectives such as maximizing profits or minimizing fulfillment cost, and focus on the
design of efficiency-improving contracts between the buyer and the supplier (e.g., Cachon 2003;
Pasternack 2008; Cachon and Lariviere 2005). Although a contract can be an effective tool to
agree on obvious metrics such as cost and order quantities, other aspects of the relationship where
what suppliers do affects the firm’s bottom line are often not contractible. For example, random
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disruptions and catastrophic events are difficult to predict, therefore, it is difficult for both parties
to agree on specific actions (response, compensation, etc.) in a standard fulfillment contract. In
case of a complex fulfillment deal, it may not be feasible to specify numerous details. For those, the
supplier usually has a discretion to choose a quality level. For instance, if the noise level of a hard
disc spindle is not specified in a contract, the supplier is not required (although noise reduction
is certainly desired by the buyer) to sufficiently reduce the noise level of the product (Kaya and
Özer 2009). In a similar vein, the quality of a multi-faceted service is not fully contractible and
enforceable. Our own conversations with a quality assurance manager for a global logistics com-
pany revealed that several aspects of service quality are not part of their contracts with customers.
For example, the training level of the employees managing the account or how fast the customer
is notified in case of a potential delay in the delivery are important aspects of quality which are
rarely specified in a contract. As in Kaya and Özer (2009), our definition of quality is “the prod-
uct attributes for which consumers prefer more to less”. Laffont and Tirole (1993) formally define
this type of quality as observable but non-verifiable. They argue that, while “quality is usually
observable by consumers before or after consumption”, quality is verifiable only “if its level can be
(costlessly) described ex-ante in a contract and ascertained ex-post by a court” (Ch.4 p.211).
In these cases of non-contractible quality, instruments based on behavioral and social preferences
greatly impact the nature of a relationship and the supply chain performance. For example, recipro-
cal motives or concerns about reputation may provide incentives for suppliers to exert extra efforts.
Similarly, a supplier’s effort can be encouraged by a buyer’s expression of approval or reward. Many
firms give out “Outstanding Supplier” or “Supplier of the Year” awards to their best suppliers for
their “above and beyond” efforts and commitment. The awards are typically given to suppliers who
excel in creative cost-reduction solutions, teamwork, customer service, response to supply chain
disruption, or sustainability. For example, in 2011, Verizon recognized Ciena with an “Outstanding
Performance Award” for the outstanding performance of Ciena’s packet-optical switches during a
Japanese earthquake1. Johnson Controls issued a press release announcing that its power solutions
division received the GM’s 2009 Supplier of the Year Award for consistently exceeding GM’s expec-
tations2. The formats of these awards or recognitions vary highly from one company to another.
Some companies hold a “supplier day” and publicly award outstanding suppliers. Other companies
choose more informal and private ways to recognize suppliers – dinner or golf invitation from the
CEO of a buying firm or a complimentary communication sent to a manager of a supplier. One
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different depending on whether the award is publicly announced or not. Specifically, we compare a
setting where the award is privately given to a setting where the award is public. Our theoretical
model and experiments compare the outcomes of these two settings and extract two different effects
associated with a symbolic award – incentive and competition effects. The insights from our model
and ensuing experiments will shed light on how the firm should convey positive recognition to its
suppliers.
There are a number of reasons why some suppliers may care about symbolic awards, even when
these are non-monetary. For example, suppliers may seek free press coverage and advertising or
preferential treatment in future transactions with the buyer. In some cases, a supplier’s corporate
culture and incentives encourage its managers to seek awards from business counterparts. For
instance, if a manager’s performance incentives (i.e., promotion, bonuses) are tied to the buying
firm’s recognition or feedback, awards will affect his/her efforts and responses to the buying firm.
Another plausible explanation is that even in a supplier-buyer relationship, decision makers who
are involved in forming, retaining, and dissolving the relationship are, after all, individuals. Even in
large corporations such as GM3, a relationship with a key supplier is often managed by a handful
of individuals whose social preferences and behavior will influence the relationship that develops
between the firms. Thus, if symbolic awards induce intrinsic motivation of individuals working in
the supplier as verified through a number of experiments in behavioral economics (Lacetera and
Macis 2010b, Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011, Ashraf et al. 2012, Bradler et al. 2013), their actions
affect relationships at a corporate level. Statements made by general managers after receiving
supplier awards provide support in this direction. For example, the CEO of LMI4 said in 2013,
“All of our employees are very proud of the Leaders Choice award by Boeing. We’ve partnered
with Boeing for many years and are grateful for the recognition”. Similarly, the general manager
at Johnson Controls5 said in 2012: “It’s an honor to be recognized by the Chrysler Group as the
Supplier of the Year in the Diversity Supplier Development category”. These statements suggest
that symbolic recognitions may positively affect the intrinsic motivation of the employees at the
recipient firm.
From a buying firm’s perspective, it looks as if these symbolic awards can do no harm at all.
After all, most awards have little direct cost to the buyer, yet a positive feedback recognizes a
supplier’s effort and improves the nature of a relationship between two firms. Since these awards
3 Conversations within GM and with three of GM’s top tier-one suppliers in the automotive industry were conducted
by students of University of Michigan during the Spring-Summer semester of 2011.
4 Source: http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/globenewswire/10029153.htm
5 Source: http:// www.adient.com/media/press-releases/2012/06/15/johnson-controls-named-2012-chrysler-supplier-
of-the-year-for-diversity-supplier-development.
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are given to suppliers who exert above and beyond efforts for the buyer, a symbolic award seems
to be an effective tool to help the buyer recognize and retain its supplier. However, when there are
multiple firms on both the buying side and the supply side, the effect of a symbolic award is more
complicated than in a setting with one buyer and one supplier or a setting with one buyer and
multiple suppliers (Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011, Eriksson and Villeval 2012, Bradler et al. 2013).
For instance, if there are multiple buyers (and they want to locate good suppliers), it is not clear
whether these “symbolic” awards are indeed cost-free. A publicized award informs which supplier
is good to other buyers. If the gain from working with a good supplier is significant and/or there
is scarcity of good suppliers (e.g., a good supplier is hard to find or the capacity of a good supplier
is limited), the presence of other buying firms makes it costly for the firm to build and retain the
relationship with a good supplier. In a market with multiple buyers, a supplier may leverage the
award to increase its profits. Thus, it is possible that a “selfish” supplier could initially exert high
efforts to get a favorable contract and then reap off benefit by shirking later on.
The main question of this paper is whether giving a symbolic award to a supplier enhances or
disrupts a supply-chain relationship when there are multiple buyers and suppliers. Two opposite
effects are central to our paper. The first is a motivational effect by which symbolic awards improve
suppliers’ effort. The other force is a competition effect whereby awards intensify competition
among buyers. Our main research questions are as follows: (1) Do awards have the motivational
effect? (2) In a market with multiple buyers, how significant is the competition effect in undercutting
the motivational benefit of an award? (3) Considering both effects combined, when is giving out
an award most beneficial for the buyer and what type of award does the buyer prefer? To answer
these questions, we develop a model where we analyze four different settings: a benchmark case
with no awards, a setting where the awards are private, a setting where awards are public, and a
setting where the awards are private but the supplier’s choice of quality is public information.
We analyze a stylized model and derive testable hypotheses. We then test the validity of our
theoretical hypotheses with a series of lab experiments that reproduce the settings of our theoretical
model. Our results show that symbolic awards do have the incentive effect and lead to higher
provision of quality. At the same time, the competition effect forces buyers to pay higher prices
to transact with good suppliers when awards are public. We also discuss the implications of a
symbolic award to the firm’s profit and show that, while a symbolic award increases total profits,
it does not fully restore the efficiency loss to a supply chain.
2. Literature Review
As supply chain structure becomes more complex and decentralized, one of the key issues is how
to design and manage an efficient supply chain. Earlier papers in this area focus on optimal mech-
anisms and/or creative contracts (see Cachon 2003 for an extensive review) using levers such as
Beer, Ahn, and Leider: Incentive and Competition Effects of Supplier Awards 5
quantity, price, quality, or capacity. However, both academics and practitioners well recognize that
a good relationship goes beyond price and quantity negotiation (Liker and Choi 2004). A rela-
tionship between a supplier and a buyer is often multi-faceted, and many aspects that define a
relationship cannot be explicitly written in a contract. One way to improve supply chain efficiency
in such case is to recognize and utilize social attributes and preferences such as social norms,
fairness, and trust. Cui et al. (2007), Loch and Wu (2008), Katok and Pavlov (2013) find that
fairness plays an important role in supply chain performance. Özer et al. (2011), Özer et al. (2014),
Spiliotopoulou et al. (2015) show that trust and trustworthiness impact how a buyer and a supplier
share information for demand planning. These results show that incorporating social preferences
is important in understanding how supply chains can be managed more effectively.
In our paper, we investigate how a symbolic award affects the provision of unenforceable quality
in a buyer-supplier relationship. Behavioral aspects of quality decisions in supply chains are still
relatively unexplored. Davis and Hyndman (2016) study the efficacy of mechanisms for managing
suppliers’ quality. They find that deferred payment mechanisms, under which a buyer offers a
bonus payment after a review of a supplier’s work, can incentivize a supplier to exert higher effort.
Our paper, on the other hand, focuses on aspects of quality which are not contractible (even when
they are potentially observable to both parties). They also find that relational mechanisms, such
as a long-term relationship where there is the threat of punishment, improve quality and supply
chain efficiency. On the contrary, we focus on a setting where concerns about building a long-term
relationship are absent or insufficient to drive suppliers’ behavior.
Awards work as a form of feedback from buyers to suppliers by communicating appreciation,
recognition, or gratitude. In the economics literature, multiple papers establish that feedback on
status or relative comparison incentivizes agents: Lazear and Rosen (1979), Green and Stokey
(1982), and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) study principal-agent problems in a tournament or contest
and show that linking monetary reward to rank orders or relative performance outperforms the
payment based on absolute performance. A stream of literature in behavioral economics shows that
negative or positive feedback has motivational effects in a situation where a moral hazard or free
riding exists. Fehr and Gächter (2000) shows that a costly (monetary) sanction reduces free-riding
and increases contribution in a public goods game. Noussair and Tucker (2005) and Masclet et al.
(2003) further show that even informal sanctions such as an expression of disapproval can increase
contributions towards a public good. Similarly, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) allow unrestricted
verbal feedback in a dictator game and show that allowing for feedback reduces extreme split (e.g.,
100-0) and increases the likelihood of equal splits. In a similar vein, the experiments by Gächter
and Fehr (1999) show that verbal approvals or praises induce cooperative actions. In Bolton et al.
(2004) feedback improves transaction efficiency in an online market.
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The motivational effects of non-pecuniary rewards have been studied in principal-agent settings
as well. Using a field experiment, Kube et al. (2012) show that gifts that are costly to an employer
are effective in inducing reciprocal actions from employees (even when they do not provide monetary
gains). In particular, they show that non-monetary gifts have larger impact than monetary gifts of
similar value. Baron and Kreps (1999) propose that workers endow a higher value to a gift if the
gift is costly to an employer. The paper finds that, even when an award is non-monetary, the fact
that the award is costly to a buyer influences an agent’s action. The existing literature shows that
rewards do not need to be monetary or tangible gifts to motivate agents. Theoretical work by Besley
and Ghatak (2008) shows that status rewards (such as a job title or medal) can work as incentive
devices. In a laboratory experiment, Peeters and Vorsatz (2013) find that sending approval with a
“smiley face” increases contributions in a public goods game. A field experiment by Lacetera and
Macis (2010b) shows that the frequency of blood donation increases when symbolic awards (i.e.,
rewarding donors with symbolic “medals”) are given in public. Ashraf et al. (2012) show that non-
financial awards (e.g., a star) are more effective in increasing workers’ effort than financial incentives
in a public health setting. Bradler et al. (2013) and Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) show that
congratulatory cards have motivational effects on individuals performing a data entry task. While
these papers establish the effectiveness of symbolic awards in incentivizing effort, most papers focus
on settings with a single principal (employer). In contrast, we explicitly consider a setting where
there are multiple buying firms (principals) and multiple suppliers (agents), representing a typical
supply chain landscape. We posit that awards may have different implications when there are
multiple buying firms. We find that symbolic awards which appear to be costless to the principal
(they have no direct monetary cost), can be quite costly to the buyer depending on how the award
is instrumented.
The study that is perhaps most relevant to our work is Eriksson and Villeval (2012). They study
the effects of symbolic awards on the length of employment by conducting an experiment where an
employer can issue a costly award to an employee. In their experimental design, the award is only
visible to a recipient (private) and is interpreted as an expression of recognition or “respect”. They
show that a costly symbolic award works as a coordinating device to initiate a relational contract
and is used strategically by the employer to prolong a profitable relationship. They analyze different
settings varying in labor market condition (excess supply, excess demand, balanced), and find that
the impact of an award changes depending on the market condition. For instance, when there is
excess supply of labor, employers strategically use awards to prolong profitable relationships. On
the other hand, when there is excess demand of labor, suppliers have a stronger bargaining power,
thus awards do not play a significant role. They show that the incentive role of a symbolic award
is the most significant in a balanced market.
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Our paper is different from theirs in several ways. First, unlike their setting in which awards are
symbolic to agents but costly to the principal, we consider truly symbolic awards as most supplier
awards incur no or very little direct cost to the buyer (they usually take the form of a plaque of a
negligible monetary cost6). More importantly, we reflect the industry practice that many of these
awards are announced in public (through press releases and/or events) by explicitly comparing
private and public award settings. This allows us to disentangle the incentive and competition
effects. Making awards private (i.e., they are only visible to the recipient) allows us to test a purely
motivational effect of the award. Public awards (which are also visible to other buyers) allow us to
study how the award impacts the competition between buyers to get a “good” supplier. Finally, to
examine how the nature of a relationship between a buyer and a supplier changes with an award,
we consider a two-period game and examine how price and efforts change over time as we vary the
award setting from private to public.
3. Theoretical Model
We consider a two-period model with two buyers and two suppliers – we denote them supplier (he)
i, i= 1 or 2, and buyer (it) j, j = 1 or 2. A two-period model is useful for the purpose of answering
our research questions. The second period is important since it allows us to examine the effects
a first-period award has on a future interaction (competition effect). In addition, a two-period
model enables us to examine the intrinsic value of the award in a final period, when concerns
about reputation and future interactions are not present (incentive effect). In the experiment,
subjects play several rounds of two-period games in a session. This provides several observations
of final-period play, while it still allows for the competition effect to arise.
In each transaction period t (t= 1,2), each buyer makes an offer to a supplier. The offer consists
of two parts, a price that it will pay to the supplier, pt ≥ 0 and the minimum effort level that it
wishes the supplier will exert, q̂t ≥ 0. If the supplier accepts the buyer’s offer, he must decide how
much effort to exert towards quality, denoted by qt ≥ 0. The effort is costly and the cost of effort,
C(q), is strictly convex and increasing in effort level, q. Once a buyer sees the supplier’s efforts,
the buyer decides whether to give out a symbolic award to the supplier. We note that, while effort
level is observable ex post, it is neither contractible nor enforceable. This means that an offer does
not enforce the supplier to deliver the requested quality, q̂t. Once the buyer observes the effort, it
can choose to give an award to the supplier at its discretion.
In the first transaction period, each buyer is initially matched with one supplier and can make
an offer only to the matched supplier. In the second transaction, both buyers are free to trade with
6 See for example: http://www.ciena.com/connect/blog/Verizon-recognizes-Ciena-with-Supplier-of-the-Year-
award.html and http://about.usps.com/suppliers/performance-awards.htm
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any of the two suppliers. We assume that the buyer chooses one of the three actions: (1) making
a new offer to the other supplier, (2) making a new offer to the existing supplier, (3) keeping the
existing offer to the existing supplier (we call this a continuing offer) with an option to match any
competing offer from the other buyer. Option (2) allows an incumbent buyer to change the terms
of a contract with the supplier (for example, lowering the price). This captures a buyer’s ability to
adjust the contract in the second period even if it chooses to keep the same supplier. Option (3)
captures an incumbent buyer’s advantage over his competitors (the option to match other buyers’
offers) when everything else remains equal. In addition, if a buyer fails to secure a deal with a
supplier (e.g., his offer is either out-bid or rejected), he is free to make a new offer to a different
supplier.
We assume that there are two types of suppliers in the marketplace, differing in how they value a
symbolic award.7 A “low-(motivational) type” supplier has no intrinsic value for a symbolic award,
therefore, he chooses an action that maximizes his monetary profit over two periods (in each period,
his profit is the price minus the cost of effort). On the other hand, a “high-(motivational) type”
supplier draws intrinsic value from winning a symbolic award. Thus, the utility of a high-type
supplier accounts for both monetary payoffs and transaction utility from winning an award. To
formalize this, let ϕ be the transaction utility a high-type supplier draws from an award. Then,




[pt +ϕAt −C(qt)] (1)
where At is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the supplier gets the award in period t. The
low-type supplier’s utility, U l(·) is just the monetary profit over two periods. We assume that a
supplier is a high-type with probability π, and a supplier’s type is his own private information. We
also assume that the types of two suppliers are independent.
On the other hand, the payoff that the buyer receives from a supplier’s effort, qt, is αqt, where
α is an efficiency coefficient. Since the award is costless for the buyer, the buyer’s utility is given




[αqt − pt]. (2)
To draw hypothesis, we analyze the equilibrium in four different scenarios. In the no-award case
(denoted by NA), no award is allowed. In the private award case (PrA), a buyer can give a private
7 For expository simplicity, we focus on motivation to receive an award as the only non-selfish utility component.
This emphasizes the role of the award in changing behavior. This simple model predicts a price of zero absent the
competition effect. We can easily extend the model to generate positive prices by including fairness concerns. For
example, if we assume that both types will only accept offers with price p≥ p, and after accepting such an offer will
give effort at least q ≥ q, there is an interval of (p, q) values such that there exists a separating equilibrium of the
form we consider in the main text. The effect of the award is essentially the same in this extended model. In our
experiment we observe that most prices and qualities are non-zero.
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award, thus the award is not known to the other buyer and supplier. In the public award case
(PuA), a buyer can give an award, which will be announced in public. Finally, in the public quality
case (PuQ), the award is private but the supplier’s effort level is public information. A comparison
between the no-award and private award cases allows us to examine the effect of the award on
suppliers’ effort in absence of competition effects. In particular, a comparison of effort in the second
(and final) period allows us to isolate the incentive effect as concerns about reputation and future
interactions are not present in the last period. The public award case allows us to explore the
competition effect, as the award will be announced to the other buyer and supplier. Finally, the
public quality case serves as a benchmark with full transparency of suppliers’ efforts. A comparison
between this case and the public award case allows us to examine how much of the efficiency of
fully transparent transactions can be achieved with a symbolic award.
We first analyze the no-award case and show that, in equilibrium, no supplier exerts efforts. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 1. If awards are not available (scenario NA), suppliers exert zero effort in both periods.
Buyers’ offers have zero price and any requested quality can be supported in equilibrium.
To see why this is the case, note that effort is not enforceable, thus it is a dominant strategy
for suppliers to exert no effort in the last period. Anticipating this, no buyer will pay positive
prices in equilibrium. Since there is no award, both types of suppliers act exactly the same and
the equilibrium has zero price and zero effort in both periods. Establishing this as a benchmark,
the next result shows that a high-type supplier will act differently from a low-type supplier if the
buyers have the option to give out a symbolic award.
We now consider the setting where buyers can give symbolic awards. Since our game features four
different players interacting over two periods, there can be many equilibria. We apply a number of
refinements so that the remaining equilibria are consistent with the literature on symbolic awards
and relevant to our primary focus on the interaction between incentive and competition effects.
First, we restrict to separating equilibria where a high-type supplier (who has intrinsic value for an
award) exerts higher effort than a low-type supplier (who only cares about monetary gain). This is
consistent with the literature on symbolic awards. Second, we focus on equilibria where the buyer
gives a supplier an award if and only if the supplier chooses a quality that is greater or equal to
the requested quality (from now onward defined as “truth-telling” equilibria). This requirement
precludes unrealistic equilibria where a buyer gives an award to a supplier who exerts subpar efforts
(e.g., an equilibrium where a buyer gives an award randomly irrespective of the supplier’s effort).
Truth-telling equilibria are consistent with firms’ practices of using awards for supplier excellence.
An equilibrium that violates this requirement undermines the reputation and credibility of the
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award, hence it is not sustainable in the long run. We also apply the intuitive criterion (Cho and
Kreps 1987) to further refine the equilibria. This condition is to only select equilibria with plausible
actions and beliefs.
We first show that, in the private award setting, there exists a separating equilibrium in which
a low-type supplier exerts no efforts and does not get the award, and a high-type supplier gets the
award in both periods by meeting the requested quality (qt = q̂t).
Lemma 2. In the private award scenario (PrA), there exists a separating equilibrium in which
a low-type supplier exerts no effort and does not receive an award while a high-type supplier exerts
strictly positive effort and receives an award in both periods. As a result, in the first period, all
buyers offer p1 = 0 and q̂1 =C
−1(ϕ), low-type suppliers choose q1 = 0 and do not get the award, and
high-type suppliers choose q1 = q̂1 and get the award. In the second transaction, all buyers make
continuing offers to their own suppliers with p2 = 0 and q̂2 = C
−1(ϕ), low-type suppliers choose
q2 = 0 and do not get the award, and high-type suppliers choose q2 = q̂2 and receive the award.
The proof is relegated to the Appendix. To see why a buyer who is matched with a low-type
supplier is not better-off by deviating from the equilibrium and making an offer to the other
supplier, remember that making a continuing offer gives a buyer the option to match the other
buyer’s offer. Therefore, if the other supplier is a high-type, a new offer to this supplier will be
matched by the incumbent buyer (who has made a continuing offer in the first period).8 As a result,
the buyer who faced a low-type supplier cannot benefit from switching.
The truth-telling equilibrium with private awards in Lemma 2 has zero price in both periods. In
contrast, the nature of an equilibrium changes when the award is announced in public. In Lemma
3 we show that a strictly positive price is possible in equilibrium. In preparation, let us define
p̄= αq̂2, which we will show as the maximum price that allows a buyer to earn positive profits in
the second period in a truth-telling equilibrium.
Lemma 3. In the public award scenario (PuA), there is an equilibrium with strictly positive price
in period 2. In this equilibrium, buyers offer p1 = 0 and q̂1 =C
−1(ϕ+(1− π)p̄) in the first period.
All high-type suppliers choose q1 = q̂1 and get the award while all low-type suppliers choose q1 = 0
and do not get the award. In the second period:
8 We assume a tie-breaking rule where, if both offers are equal, a supplier chooses to close a deal with the same buyer
as in period 1. This tie-breaking rule makes intuitive sense in the context of our study. If a supplier chooses “above and
beyond” quality (q1 ≥ q̂1) and the buyer recognizes this effort with an award, the supplier is likely to prefer to remain
in a relationship with this buyer. This behavior is consistent with previous literature on supply chain partnerships. In
conversations with suppliers from a wide range of industries Lovejoy (2010) describes as a recurrent theme that “most
respondents suggested that good companies strive to build and maintain partnerships”. The conversations revealed
that “many respondents mentioned trust and relationships as the key to avoiding the overhead expense of full supply
chain monitoring. Ideally, the tier 0 firm knows how their tier 1 suppliers do business, and believe that the suppliers
in turn value the relationship and want to maintain it”.
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(i) If a buyer believes that both suppliers are of high type, this buyer makes a new offer to its own
supplier with p2 = 0 and q̂2 =C
−1(ϕ). The high-type supplier accepts the offer, chooses q2 = q̂2
and gets the award in the second period.
(ii) If a buyer believes that both suppliers are of low type, it makes a continuing offer with p2 = 0
and q̂2 =C
−1(ϕ+(1−π)p̄). The low-type supplier chooses q2 = 0 and does not get the award.
(iii) If a buyer believes that its own supplier is of high type and the other supplier is of low
type, it makes a new offer to its own supplier with price p2 = p̄ and a request q̂2 =
min{C−1(ϕ),C ′−1(α)}. The high-type supplier accepts the offer, chooses q2 = q̂2 and gets the
award in the second period.
(iv) If a buyer believes that its own supplier is of low type and the other supplier is of high type,
it offers the high-type supplier p2 = p̄ with a request q̂2 =min{C−1(ϕ),C ′−1(α)}. The supplier
receives two identical offers and rejects this buyer’s offer. The buyer then offers p2 = 0 to its
own low-type supplier, who chooses q2 = 0 and does not get the award.
In this equilibrium, p2 is strictly positive when one supplier is a high-type and the other supplier
is a low-type. The frequency of this interesting case depends on π, and it is maximized when
π= 0.5. The equilibrium is fully characterized in the proof presented in the Appendix. Intuitively,
the difference between the private and public awards cases is that in the private award setting,
the buyer’s belief about the other supplier remains unchanged in the second period. On the other
hand, when the award is public, a buyer can update its belief about the other supplier’s type after
observing whether he receives an award in the first period. In our truth-telling equilibrium, a buyer
who believes that its own supplier is a high type and the other is not will make an offer with a
positive price to its own supplier to keep him in the second period. This is because, if the buyer
does not do that, the other buyer can steal the high-type supplier with a positive price.
Finally, the scenario with public quality and private award (PuQ) has a truth-telling equilibrium
which is the same as that under the public award scenario (PuA). The only difference is that rather
than updating their beliefs about the suppliers’ types based on whether they received an award in
the first period, buyers update their beliefs based on actual observations of efforts. This result is
stated in Lemma 4, with the formal proof presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 4. In the public quality scenario (PuQ) the same equilibrium as in the public award
setting (PuA) can arise, where buyers update their beliefs based on suppliers’ quality in period 1.
Based on previous results, the next proposition establishes how a buyer’s expected profit varies
across scenarios. The proofs of Lemmas 1 to 3 presented in the Appendix, show that both the
private and public award scenarios (PrA and PuA) result in higher expected buyer’s profits than
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the no-award case (NA).9 When comparing the private and public award settings, the equilibria in
Lemmas 2 and 3 prescribe that both quality in period 1 and price in period 2 will be higher in the
public award setting. While higher quality in period 1 leads to higher buyer’s profit, higher price in
period 2 leads to lower buyer’s profit. The next proposition states that when the symbolic award
is sufficiently valuable to the suppliers, buyers’ expected profit is higher when awards are private
than when awards are public. Specifically, a buyer’s expected profit when awards are private is
π2αC−1(ϕ) and when awards are public it is π[αC−1(ϕ+(1−π)αC−1(ϕ))+παC−1(ϕ)]. The former
expression is greater than the latter when (2− π)C−1(ϕ)−C−1(ϕ+ (1− π)αC−1(ϕ)) > 0, which
holds for sufficiently large values of ϕ (that is, when the value of a symbolic award is high enough).
Finally, from Lemma 4, buyers’ expected profit in the public quality scenario is as in the public
award scenario.
Proposition 1. (i) A buyer’s average profit is higher in both private and public award scenarios
(PrA and PuA) than in the no-award case (NA), (ii) if the symbolic award is sufficiently valuable
for the supplier (ϕ is sufficiently high), the buyer’s expected profit is higher with private awards
(PrA) than with public awards (PuA), (iii) in the public quality scenario (PuQ), a buyer’s expected
profit is as in the public award scenario (PuA).
The proof of proposition 1 is presented in the Appendix. Based on these theoretical results,
we derive hypotheses for the incentive and competition effects to be tested with a laboratory
experiment.
4. Experimental Design
The experimental setup is identical to our theoretical model. In each session of the experiment,
subjects play six rounds of a computerized game within which two buyers and two suppliers transact
in two periods. We conducted the experiment using the z-Tree software package (Fischbacher 2007).
In each round, subjects are randomly and anonymously matched in groups of four. The groups
remain together for the entire round (two periods) and are dissolved when the round is over. New
groups are formed for the following round. At the beginning of each round, the members of a group
are randomly assigned a role (two subjects play as buyers and two subjects play as suppliers) and
a label (Buyer 1, Buyer 2, Supplier 1, Supplier 2) which they keep for the entire round.
For the first period, each buyer is randomly paired up with a supplier in the same group and
can only make an offer to that supplier. The first transaction consists of the following four stages:
9 For the comparison between the no-award and private award cases, note that both the no-award and the private
award cases result in p= 0 in equilibrium, but while the no-award case has zero quality in both periods, the private
award scenario can still induce positive quality (Lemma 2). For the comparison between the no-award and public
award cases note that, while buyers earn zero profits in the no-award case, we show that in the public award scenario
the buyers’ expected profit is strictly positive (Lemma 3).
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1) The buyer makes an offer to the supplier. The offer consists of a price it is willing to pay for the
good, which can range between 0 and 100 and a requested quality, which can range between 0 and
10. 2) The supplier decides whether he accepts or rejects the offer. If rejected, both players get a
zero payoff. 3) If the supplier accepts the offer, he chooses a quality level for the good he provides.
The buyer’s requested quality level from the contract is non-binding so the supplier can choose
quality freely. Quality can range between 0 and 10 and is costly for the supplier. We assume that
the cost of quality takes a canonical form of c(q) = 1
2
q2. In order to simplify the subjects’ task, they
are presented with table 1 on their screens. 4) If awards are available, the buyer sees the quality
chosen by the supplier and decides if it gives him a symbolic award. Whether the award is only
shown to the supplier or if it is shown to everyone in the group varies by treatment.
Table 1 Cost of Quality Function
q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(q) 0 0.5 2 4.5 8 12.5 18 24.5 32 40.5 50
In the second transaction, buyers can make an offer to any of the two suppliers in their group.
The stages are as follows: The buyer chooses between the following options: a) Making a continuing
offer to the same supplier, in which case the offer (price and requested quality) remains the same
as in the first transaction. This option gives the buyer a right to match if the other buyer makes an
offer to its supplier. b) Making a new offer to the same supplier with different price and requested
quality level. In this case, the buyer does not have the opportunity to match the other buyer’s offer
to its supplier. c) Making an offer, of any price and any requested quality, to the other supplier.
If a buyer made a continuing offer to its own supplier and the other buyer also made an offer to
this same supplier, the former can choose between matching the other buyer’s offer and keeping its
original continuing offer. Then, the supplier observes the offer (or offers) he received and accepts
at most one offer or opts out of the second period of the game. If the supplier accepts an offer, then
he chooses a quality level. In the case where both buyers made an offer to the same supplier, the
buyer who was not picked can make an offer to the other supplier. It makes a new offer (price and
requested quality) and the supplier decides whether he accepts the offer and if so a quality level. If
awards are available, each buyer decides whether they give the supplier a symbolic award. When
the second trading period is over, new groups are formed for the following round and subjects are
randomly assigned a new role. Note that there are six rounds in a session, therefore most subjects
get to play both as buyers and suppliers.10
The symbolic award is an image of a ribbon that appears for a few seconds on the screen of the
supplier who is granted the award. Figure 4 in Appendix shows a screenshot of the award screen.
10 All subjects who participated in the experiment, except one, played at least one round in the role of supplier. All
subjects, except one, played at least one round in the role of buyer.
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Giving an award has no cost for the buyer and does not grant extra profit for a supplier. That
is, the award has no direct effect on the participants’ monetary payoffs. To ensure that subjects
were fully aware of this, after the instructions were read out loud, subjects were presented with
examples of different possible scenarios of play and were asked to compute the profits for the buyer
and the supplier in the example. Subjects could not exit the screen until they entered the correct
answer.
We conducted the following four treatments. The first treatment is a No-Award case (NA) where
awards are not available and the quality choices are only shown to the respective buyer. The second
treatment is a Private Award/Private Information case (PrA) in which only the corresponding
buyer and supplier can observe the quality chosen and the award, if there is one. The third treatment
is a Public Award/Private Information case (PuA) in which the award can be seen by everyone but
the quality level can only be observed by the corresponding buyer. The last treatment is a Private
Award/ Public Information case (PuQ) in which the award is private, but suppliers’ quality choices
are shown to everyone. The treatments are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 Experimental Design - Treatments Summary
Treatment Award Information about Quality
No Award (NA) N/A Private
Private Award (PrA) Private Private
Public Award (PuA) Public Private
Public Quality (PuQ) Private Public
The stage in which suppliers may receive a symbolic award, is only present in the PrA, PuA, and PuQ treatments.
The payoffs are expressed in tokens and converted into dollars (at a rate of $0.05/token) for
payment at the end of the experiment. One of the six rounds played is randomly chosen for payment.
In each round, the subjects’ payoff is the sum of their payoff in both transactions. The supplier
begins each round with 60 points, and the retailer with 100 points, to avoid negative payoffs. For
each transaction, the payoffs are calculated as follows: the buyer’s payoff is 100 plus ten times the
quality chosen by the supplier minus the price he pays, ΠB = 100+10q−p, or ΠB = 0 if his offer is
rejected. The supplier’s payoff is 60 plus the price she gets for the good minus her cost of quality,
ΠS = 60+ p− c(q), or ΠS = 0 if she rejects all offers and opts out of the trading period. Subjects
receive a $7 participation fee, plus their earnings from the experiment (which can range between
$0 and $20).
5. Hypotheses
We derive hypotheses for the incentive and competition effects of a symbolic award based on our
previous theoretical results. The results in Lemmas 2 and 3 are based on “truth-telling” equilibria
where a buyer gives out an award if and only if the supplier chooses a quality that is greater or
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equal to the requested quality. In order to test this assumption, the first hypothesis is that there
exists a threshold level above which a buyer gives out a symbolic award. In the experiment, we
expect buyers’ decision to give an award to be positively correlated with the provision of a quality
level that is equal or greater than the requested level.
HYPOTHESIS 1. [Award Criterion] Buyers offer awards predominantly to suppliers who meet
or exceed the requested quality.
Based on Lemma 2, the second hypothesis predicts that suppliers will provide a higher quality
when awards are available. When awards are available, a separating equilibrium arises in which
buyers request some positive level of quality to give out the award. Thus, suppliers who care about
the award, are willing to provide additional positive quality in order to receive an award.
HYPOTHESIS 2. [Quality Effects of Awards] The average quality when awards are available is
higher than in the no-awards case.
The third hypothesis predicts that, due to the competition effect, buyers pay higher prices to good
suppliers when awards are public. This prediction is based on Lemma 3, which states that in the
public-award case, the expected price is higher than the price in the private-award case. In the
equilibrium described in Lemma 3, a high type supplier receives an award in the first transaction.
Because the award is observable to all players, in the second transaction both buyers compete to
win the deal with the high-type supplier. As a result, the winning buyer pays a higher price than
if the awards are private or if awards are not available.
HYPOTHESIS 3. [Competition Effects] The expected price paid in the second period to a supplier
who received an award in the first period is higher when the award is public than when the award
is private or unavailable.
Lastly, the fourth hypothesis makes predictions about buyers’ profits based on Proposition 1(i).
According to Lemmas 2 and 3, buyers’ profits are higher when awards are available than when they
are not. This is because, when a supplier cares about the award, additional motivation driven by an
award increases the supplier’s effort, which results in higher profit for the buyer. However, whether
the award is given in an informal or public setting matters. In the private award case, the only effect
that can arise is the incentive effect. Thus, an increase in buyers’ profit relative to the no-award
case would capture the buyer’s increased surplus from the incentive effect of the award. This is
not the same for the public setting. When the award is announced in a marketplace with multiple
buyers, the award creates a competition and increases the cost of maintaining a relationship with a
good supplier. This reduces the gain derived from the motivational effect. Proposition 1(ii) predicts
that, when a symbolic award is highly valued by a supplier, buyers’ profits are higher with private
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awards than with public awards. Finally, the public quality case is expected to be equivalent to
the public award case, based on Proposition 1(iii).
HYPOTHESIS 4. [Profits] (i) Buyers’ profits are higher when awards are available than when
they are not. (ii) In addition, buyers’ profits are higher when awards are private than when they
are public. (iii) The public award and public quality cases have equal buyers’ profits.
6. Experimental Results
The experiment was conducted at a public university located in the Midwest of the United States in
the months of March and April of 2013. The subjects were undergraduate students from a variety
of Departments at the University. We conducted sixteen sessions of the experiment, with eight or
twelve subjects per session. 44 subjects participated in the no award (NA) treatment, 40 subjects
in the private award (PrA) treatment, 36 subjects in the public award (PuA) treatment, and 36
subjects in the public quality (PuQ) treatment. Sessions lasted on average an hour an a half and
subjects earned on average 15.8 dollars – including the 7 dollar participation fee.
6.1. General Results
Table 3 presents a summary of our results based on all offers (columns one to three) and based
on accepted offers (columns four to eight). We observe that, while price offers are slightly lower
in the second period relative to the first period, the average price when we consider only the
accepted offers remains stable across periods. Average accepted price ranges between 30 and 40 and
is directionally higher in the public award and public quality treatments, providing initial support
for the competition effect. A Kruskal-Wallis11 non-parametric test shows that the difference across
groups is statistically significant (H2 = 13.52, p= 0.004 for period 1, and H2 = 21.69, p < 0.001 for
period 2). However, pair-wise comparisons show the difference is only statistically significant in
the public quality case (Wilcoxon rank-sum test for periods 1 and 2: PuQ vs. NA: p= 0.003 and
p=< 0.001; PuQ vs. PrA: p= 0.002 and p < 0.001). Average requested quality follows a pattern
that is consistent with the previous result. When we observe all offers, requested quality slightly
decreases in the second period relative to the first period, however it remains stable across periods
when we consider accepted offers only. This suggests, that buyers lower their price offers in the
second period, but they also lower the requested quality. Average quality in accepted offers is the
lowest in the no-award treatment and it is higher in the treatments where awards are available,
providing support for the incentive effect. The difference across treatments is statistically significant
in both periods (Kruskal-Wallis test: H2 = 21.56, p < 0.001 in period 1, and H2 = 10.07, p= 0.018
11 Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test for more than two groups (Kruskal and Wallis 1952).
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in period 2). While pair-wise comparisons show that the difference relative to the NA treatment is
only statistically significant in the PuQ treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p < 0.001 and p= 0.003
in periods 1 and 2 respectively), the regressions on Table 5 show that the effects are significant in
the PrA and PuA treatments once we control for price and subject-level random effects. Similarly,
the probability of suppliers choosing a quality that is greater or equal than the requested quality
is higher in the three treatments where awards are available than in the no-award treatment in
both periods (PrA vs. NA: p= 0.003 and p= 0.084; PuA vs. NA: p < 0.001 and p= 0.022; PuQ vs.
NA: p= 0.003 and p= 0.353)12. Finally, Table 3 presents the frequency with which buyers give out
awards in each treatment. We find that there are no significant differences across treatments and
that buyers give awards only slightly more often in the first period than in the second period.
Table 3 General Results
All offers Accepted offers
Treatment Price Requested Accept Price Requested Quality Quality ≥ Award
Quality Quality Req. Qty
(%) (%) (%)
NA 29.1 5.27 80.3 31.4 5.37 2.198 15.1
Period 1 PrA 25.4 4.72 75.0 30.3 4.89 2.767 33.3 42.2
PuA 31.8 4.67 85.2 32.1 4.53 2.848 40.2 46.7
PuQ 38.0 5.38 79.6 40.4 5.65 3.872 33.7 48.8
NA 25.3 4.14 81.1 31.3 5.10 2.084 16.8
Period 2 PrA 23.0 3.84 80.8 28.5 4.75 2.485 26.8 36.1
PuA 27.6 3.71 77.8 35.5 4.77 2.262 31.0 40.5
PuQ 32.1 4.32 75.0 42.8 5.77 3.185 22.2 37.0
6.2. Incentive Effect
The following subsections test the two hypotheses related to the incentive effect. First, we observe
whether buyers follow a criterion to give out awards. In particular, we test whether buyers give
awards predominantly to those suppliers who meet or exceed the requested quality (Hypothesis 1).
Second, we test whether suppliers choose higher quality when awards are available (Hypothesis 2).
6.2.1. Award Criterion We observe that the frequency with which buyers give out symbolic
awards is correlated with higher average quality, suggesting that the buyers follow a criterion to
give out awards. As shown in Table 10 in the Appendix, conditional on acceptance, in the PrA
treatment there were 38 observations of play of the first period where suppliers received awards
and 52 observations where suppliers did not get awards in the first period. The average quality in
the observations where suppliers received awards was 3.868 while it was 1.962 in the observations
where suppliers did not receive awards. In the second period, average quality in the 35 observations
12 The lack of significance in this last case is due to a right shift in the distribution of the quality requested by the
buyers in the second period of the PuQ treatment. While 70% of the accepted offers had a requested quality greater
or equal to 5 in the PuQ treatment, this was only true in 59% of the accepted offers in the NA treatment, and in
51% and 50% in the PrA and PuA treatments respectively.
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where suppliers received awards was 3.629 and in the 62 observations where suppliers did not
receive awards it was 1.839. The PuA treatment shows similar results. In the first period, the
average quality when suppliers received awards (43 observations) was 3.464 while average quality
was 2.306 when suppliers did not receive awards (34 observations). In the second period, there were
34 observations where suppliers received awards and average quality was 3.647, and 50 observations
where suppliers did not receive awards and average quality was 1.32. In addition, as predicted
by Hypothesis 1, buyers give awards to those suppliers whose quality choice meets or exceeds
their request. Figure 1 shows the probability of a buyer giving out an award as a function of the
difference between the quality chosen by the supplier and the buyer’s requested quality. In both
periods we observe a significant increase in the probability of giving out an award when quality
meets the requested quality: the probability of receiving an award increases from around 30% to
close to 100%. These results are presented formally in Table 4. We present a regression of the
probability of receiving an award on the choice of a quality level that is greater or equal to the
requested quality separately for each treatment.13 The coefficients are positive and significant in
all cases where awards are available, both in transactions 1 and 2. This indicates that meeting or
exceeding the buyer’s quality expectations leads to higher probability of receiving an award in all
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Figure 1 Probability of receiving award as a function of the difference between quality and requested quality
6.2.2. Quality Effects of Awards Our second hypothesis regarding the incentive effect pre-
dicts that average quality is higher when awards are available than in the no-awards case. Figure 2
13 All the regressions reported in the paper present estimates for panel data with subject random effects and cluster-
robust standard errors at the session level. The results remain qualitatively the same if we cluster at the group-period-
session level.
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Table 4 Interaction effects of quality and treatment on the award decision
Award Award Award Award Award Award Award Award
Coefficients Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Quality ≥ Req. Quality x PrA 0.748*** 0.717*** 0.772*** 0.719***
(0.116) (0.047) (0.105) (0.055)
Quality ≥ Req. Quality x PuA 0.756*** 0.624*** 0.761*** 0.632***
(0.064) (0.079) (0.051) (0.071)
Quality ≥ Req. Quality x PuQ 0.752*** 0.845*** 0.719*** 0.819***
(0.038) (0.056) (0.032) (0.040)
Public Award -0.005 0.031
(0.098) (0.079)
Public Quality 0.073 0.019
(0.081) (0.074)
Price -0.003** 0.001 0.0001 0.005*** 0.004** -0.002** 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.262** 0.142 0.158 0.044* 0.066 0.286*** 0.141* 0.126*
(0.108) (0.111) (0.137) (0.023) (0.069) (0.061) (0.084) (0.075)
Observations 90 97 92 84 86 81 268 262
Nr. of Subjects 38 38 36 35 35 33 109 106
OLS regression with subject random effects and standard errors clustered at the session level. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Columns 1−2 present data from
the PrA treatment, 3− 4 from the PuA treatment, 5− 6 from the PuQ treatment, and 7− 8 from PrA, PuA, and
PuQ treatments combined. Accepted offers only (each accepted offer constitutes one observation). The number of
accepted offers (and thus the number of observations and subjects) may differ from period 1 to period 2, as subjects
can accept an offer in period 1 and reject the offer(s) in period 2 and vice versa. Note: Probit estimates show similar
results but present high standard errors in columns 6 and 8 due to lack of observations for the case “Quality Higher
than Requested Quality and No Award” in period 2 of the public quality treatment. Marginal effects from Probit
regressions are 0.774, 0.875, 0.756, 0.726, 0.840, 0.900 for columns 1 to 6 respectively.
provides initial support for this hypothesis. The kernel densities of quality for the treatments where
awards are available present a shift to right relative to the no-award treatment in both periods.
A comparison that is of particular interest is that between the no-award and the private award
treatments. Since the award is private, any increase in quality relative to the no award case can
be attributed exclusively to the supplier’s value for the symbolic award. This is especially true
in the second (and final) period, where there are no strategic reasons to exert higher effort. We
observe that in the second period, the density in the private award treatment presents a rightward
shift relative to the no-award treatment, with lower densities for low values of quality and higher
densities for higher values of quality.
Table 5 confirms the predictions in Hypothesis 2 with formal statistical results. The first two
columns correspond to the comparison between the no-award and private award treatments. We
regress quality on a dummy for the private award treatment controlling for price and requested
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Figure 2 Quality in periods 1 and 2 by treatment - Kernel Densities
quality.14 We find that the private award treatment leads to higher quality in both transactions
(regression coefficients β = 0.721 and 0.728 in transactions 1 and 2 respectively). As before, since
the only difference between these two treatments is the opportunity to give a private award to the
suppliers, we attribute this increase in quality exclusively to the supplier’s value for the symbolic
award. Columns three and four in Table 5 compare the no-award treatment with the public award
treatment. Interestingly, the public award treatment leads to higher quality than the no-award
treatment in the first transaction but not in the second transaction. In transaction 1, the coefficient
is 0.783 and it is statistically significant, while in transaction 2 it is 0.073 and not significant. We
find similar results in columns five and six when we compare the no-award and the public quality
treatments (in transaction 1 the coefficient is 0.965 and significant, while in transaction 2 it is 0.283
and not significant). These results suggest that suppliers do not value public awards enough to exert
a high effort in the second period. One explanation for this is that some suppliers perceive public
awards more as a tool to get better contracts in the following transaction than as a recognition for
their effort. While a recognition for high effort would keep its intrinsic value in a second (and final)
period, a tool to get a higher price would not as the game ends in the second period. This “crowding
out” of the incentive effect when the awards are public is consistent with previous studies which
found that public rewards (both monetary and non-monetary) can have detrimental effects on
performance when completing a task (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Harackiewicz 1979, Charness
et al. 2013) or in contributions for charity (Lacetera and Macis 2010a, Ariely et al. 2009). Two
explanations have been provided to justify this phenomena. First, individuals may refrain from
14 We conducted the same regression using the difference between quality and requested quality as dependent variable
(instead of controlling for requested quality in the original regression) as a robustness check. We find that the results
provide the same insights as those on Table 5.
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exerting effort when a public non-tangible reward is at stake out of concerns for being perceived
as gullible (this argument would explain why the “crowding out” effect is also present in the PuQ
treatment where a supplier’s quality is public information). Second, extrinsic incentives make it
harder for “good” suppliers to show their true intentions. Suppliers, who are intrinsically motivated
to provide high quality cannot clearly reveal their selfless intentions if in return they receive a
public award for it.
Table 5 Effects of Treatments on Quality
PrA vs. NA PuA vs. NA PuQ vs. NA (PrA, PuA, PuQ) vs. NA
Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality Quality
Coefficients Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Private Award 0.721*** 0.728*** 0.775*** 0.693***
(0.269) (0.219) (0.223) (0.222)
Public Award 0.783*** 0.073 0.763*** 0.060
(0.266) (0.252) (0.245) (0.230)
Public Quality 0.965*** 0.283 1.059*** 0.425*
(0.317) (0.258) (0.294) (0.236)
Requested Quality 0.030 0.075 0.127 0.096 0.093 0.073 0.113 0.109**
(0.071) (0.057) (0.102) (0.083) (0.078) (0.055) (0.069) (0.052)
Price 0.048*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.098) (0.011) (0.008)
Constant 0.551*** -0.450** -0.033 0.008 -0.472 -0.553** -0.224 -0.219
(0.190) (0.211) (0.285) (0.338) (0.377) (0.244) (0.278) (0.230)
Observations 196 204 198 191 192 188 374 369
Nr. of Subjects 81 82 78 79 79 77 150 150
OLS regression with subject random effects and standard errors clustered at the session level. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Columns 1−2 present data from
the NA and PrA treatments, 3− 4 from the NA and PuA treatments, 5− 6 from the NA and PuQ treatments, and
7−8 from all four treatments combined. Accepted offers only (each accepted offer constitutes one observation). Note
that the number of accepted offers (and thus the number of observations and subjects) differs from period 1 to period
2, as subjects can accept an offer in period 1 and reject the offer(s) in period 2 and vice versa.
In order to quantify the suppliers’ value for the award in the PrA treatment, we estimate how
the likelihood of choosing a quality level depends on the probability of receiving an award given
that quality. The estimates are derived by maximum likelihood estimation from a conditional logit
model. Table 9 in the Appendix presents estimates of the value of the parameter ϕ in Equation (1)
in monetary terms. In period 1, the award is valued at 1.39 dollars (equivalent to 36% of suppliers’
average first-period payoff) and in period 2 at 1.92 dollars (equivalent to 49% of a suppliers’ average
second-period payoff). A detailed analysis is presented in the Appendix.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that average quality is higher when awards are available than in the no-
awards case. The experimental results support this hypothesis with a caveat: while in the PrA
treatment quality is significantly higher in both periods, making awards public crowds out the
intrinsic value of the award and, therefore, the PuA treatment does not lead to significantly higher
profit in period 2.
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6.3. Competition Effect
The third hypothesis predicts that when the award is public, buyers pay higher prices in the
second transaction to those suppliers who received an award in the first transaction than when
awards are private. In Table 6 we pool the data from the PrA and PuA treatments – excluding
the NA and PuQ treatments. The table shows a regression of price in transaction 2 on a dummy
variable indicating whether the supplier received an award in the first transaction, separately for
each treatment. Specifically, in Table 6 we estimate the following equation:
(Price period 2)i,t = α0 +α11[treatment= PuA] +α21[Awardperiod1 = 1]1[treatment= PuA]
+α31[Awardperiod1 = 1]1[treatment= PrA] +α4Roundi,t + νi + ϵi,t
(3)
and are interested in the comparison between α2 and α3.
We observe that when awards are public, receiving an award in the first transaction has a stronger
impact on the price offers received in the second transaction that when the awards are private.
Specifically, we compare α2 and α3 in Equation (3) and we find that the coefficients are 17.64 and
8.22 respectively, and the difference is significant (p= 0.043).
We present further analysis on the competition effect in Figure 3 (in this case we pool the data
from all four treatments, including the NA and PuQ treatments as additional benchmarks) and
focus on accepted offers only. The left chart shows the average price paid in transaction 2 to those
suppliers who received an award in period 1 (the column in gray) and to those suppliers who did
not receive an award in period 1 (the column in black). We observe that average prices paid to
suppliers who received an award in period 1 are higher in the treatments where either the award
or quality is public than in the treatment where the award is private. In addition, we note that,
the price premium the suppliers who received an award in period 1 get in period 2 relative to the
average price in the first period is also higher in the public award treatment than in the private
award treatment. In the private award treatment, average price in accepted offers in period 1 was
30.3 and the average price in period 2 for suppliers who received an award in period 1 was 31.42.
In the public award treatment it was 32.1 and 40.33 respectively. These results support the third
hypothesis which proposes that public awards increase competition for the good suppliers and
make buyers have to pay more for them.
A possible explanation for why buyers pay a higher price in period 2 to suppliers who received an
award in period 1 in the public award setting than in the private award setting, is that they have a
higher expectation about the suppliers’ provision of quality. Our experimental results show exactly
the opposite. The chart on the right in Figure 3 shows average quality in period 2 for suppliers
who received an award in period 1 and for suppliers who did not receive an award in period 1. We
observe that, average quality in suppliers who received an award in the first period is lower in the
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public award treatment than in the private award treatment. While this result was not predicted
by our hypotheses, it reinforces the notion of a competition effect: the public award treatment not
only results in buyers paying a higher price for suppliers who received an award in the first period,
but additionally, these suppliers provide lower average quality than in the private award setting.
Table 6 Interaction Effects of Award and Treatments on Price
Coefficients Price in period 2
Award in period 1 x PrA 8.22**
(4.17)







Nr. of Subjects 71
AwardxPrA = AwardxPuA (p-value) 0.043
OLS regression with subject random effects and standard errors clustered at the session level. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Note: The table includes the
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6.4. Profits and Efficiency
Average profits are presented in Table 7 and regressions with the effects of the different treatments
on profits are presented in Table 8. The difference in buyers’ profits across treatments reported in
Table 7 are statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test: H2 = 9.48, p= 0.024 for periods 1 and 2
combined). We first test Hypothesis 4(i), which predicts that buyers’ profits will be higher when
awards are available (either private or public) than when awards are not available. We find that
buyers’ profits are only significantly higher than in the no-award case, in the case where awards
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are private. When awards are public, there is no significant difference with the no-awards case.
The third column in Table 7 shows that total buyer’s profit across both periods is 183.99 in the
no-awards case while it is 195.0.5 in the private awards case (NA vs. PrA: p= 0.003) and 186.92 in
the public awards case (NA vs. PuA: p= 0.463). The third column in Table 8 shows similar results:
the effect of a PrA treatment dummy relative to the NA baseline is 11.597 points (p= 0.003), while
the effect of a PuA treatment dummy is 3.321 points (p= 0.367). These results suggest that the
PrA treatment, where the incentive effect is the only one present, has a positive impact on buyers’
profits. In the PuA case, the competition effect and the crowding out of the incentive effect in the
second period wipe away the profit premium derived from the incentive effect. In our experiment,
these effects are strong enough that public symbolic awards are no longer useful in increasing the
buyer’s profit relative to the no-award case.
Hypothesis 4(ii) further predicts that buyers’ profits are higher with private awards than with
public awards. We find that buyers’ profits are significantly higher under private awards than with
public awards, providing support for this hypothesis. Table 11 in the Appendix pools the data from
the PrA and PuA treatments only (excludes NA and PuQ) and shows that the PuA treatment
results in significantly lower buyers’ profit than the PrA treatment (β = −8.293, p = 0.010). In
addition, the coefficients corresponding to PrA and PuA in Table 8 are significantly different
(11.597 for PrA vs. 3.312 for PuA, p= 0.008). In Table 7, we observe that average total buyers’
profit across both periods is 195.05 in the private award case and 186.92 in the public award case
(PrA vs. PuA: p= 0.057). Notice that in both settings, the incentive effect increases effort levels
in period 1 (relative to the no-award setting) and the difference in average buyers’ profit across
treatments is not significant (98.00 in PrA vs. 96.94 in PuA, p= 0.519). The difference between
the two cases lies in what happens in the second period. As Table 6 shows, the price in period 2 is
higher in the public award setting since the public award triggers competition for a good supplier.
This reduces the profit premium from higher efforts in the first period. In addition, the buyer’s
profit is further reduced by the crowding out effect (i.e., efforts in the second period are lower under
the public award setting). Combining these two, the buyer’s profit is significantly lower under the
public award setting than under the private award setting in the second period (97.05 in PrA vs.
89.97 in PuA, p= 0.068). Our experimental results further show that the two adverse effects of a
symbolic award – competition and crowding-out – reduce the profit premium to the extent that
the buyer’s profit with a public award is not even significantly higher than the profit under the
no-award case.
Hypotheses 4(iii) predicts that the public award and public quality treatments are equivalent.
The experimental results show that buyers’ profit is not different in the public quality setting than
in the public award setting. In Table 8 we observe that the coefficients for the effects of the public
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award and public quality treatments on buyers’ profits are 3.312 and 6.946 respectively and not
significantly different (p-value = 0.206).
Tables 7 and 8 also present suppliers’ monetary payoffs. We do not derive formal hypotheses
for suppliers’ profits since, unlike buyers’ profits, these are an imperfect measure of total utility as
they do not capture the utility generated by the awards (i.e. transaction utility is ignored). The
difference across treatments presented in Table 7 is statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test:
H2 = 11.97, p= 0.008 for periods 1 and 2 combined). Most importantly, we find that contrary to
what happens with buyers’ profits, suppliers’ profits are lower when awards are private than when
awards are not available and when awards are public (156.03 with private awards vs. 162.78 with
no awards, p= 0.063, and vs. 164.79 with public awards, p= 0.020). This result indicates that the
private awards treatment leads simultaneously to the highest buyers’ profit and the lowest suppliers’
profit. An interesting question then is how total supply chain profit changes by treatment.
Table 7 Buyers’ and Suppliers’ Profit and Total Surplus
Buyers’ Profit Suppliers’ Profit Total Surplus (Buyer’s dyads) Group Surplus
Period Period Periods Period Period Periods Period Period Periods Periods
Treatment 1 2 1+2 1 2 1+2 1 2 1+2 1+2
NA 92.44 91.55 183.99 81.44 81.34 162.78 173.84 172.81 345.37 690.74
PrA 98.00 97.05 195.05 77.70 78.32 156.03 175.49 175.37 350.86 701.73
PuA 96.94 89.97 186.92 81.49 83.30 164.79 178.44 173.08 351.52 703.04
PuQ 98.63 91.80 190.43 83.53 85.50 169.03 182.07 177.30 359.37 718.73
Table 8 Effects of Treatments on Profit and Total Surplus
Buyers’ Profit Suppliers’ Profit Total Surplus (Buyers dyads) Group Surplus
Period Period Periods Period Period Periods Period Period Periods Periods
Coeff. 1 2 1+2 1 2 1+2 1 2 1+2 1+2
PrA 5.85*** 5.65*** 11.60*** -4.08** -3.13 -7.43 1.26 2.38 4.58 12.75
(2.22) (2.03) (3.97) (2.08) (3.76) (5.52) (2.85) (3.84) (6.72) (14.18)
PuA 4.82** -1.52 3.31 -0.07 1.79 1.48 4.36** -0.02 5.36* 14.24**
(2.34) (1.94) (3.67) (2.18) (2.71) (4.25) (1.70) (1.41) (2.89) (6.93)
PuQ 6.44** 0.42 6.95* 2.10 4.17 6.28 8.34*** 4.65 14.16** 31.94***
(2.71) (1.83) (3.76) (3.25) (3.40) (6.12) (3.21) (2.89) (5.90) (11.90)
Cons 92.09*** 91.45*** 183.49*** 81.55*** 81.39*** 163.03*** 173.93*** 172.91*** 345.74*** 688.53***
(1.63) (1.62) (3.12) (1.06) (2.52) (3.49) (0.67) (1.00) (1.73) (4.93)
Obs. 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 468 234
Nr. of
Subjects 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 129
OLS regression with subject random effects and standard errors clustered at the session level. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The table presents the data from
the four treatments combined. The number of subjects is 155, since all 156 subjects in the experiment except one
played at least one round in the role of supplier and all 156 subjects except one played at least one round in the
role of buyer (roles were assigned at random at the beginning of each round). The total number of observations for
each role (supplier or buyer) corresponds to the six rounds played in all four treatments combined –234 groups with
2 players in each role per group.
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Finally, Tables 7 and 8 present the results for total surplus. The first three columns show buyers’
dyads15 and the last column shows the sum of the profits of all four members of a group. The
difference across all four treatments in Table 7 is statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis test:
H2 = 12.46, p = 0.006 for buyers’ dyads periods 1 and 2, and H2 = 11.11, p = 0.011 for group
surplus). Pair-wise comparisons show that average total surplus is only significantly higher in the
public quality treatment (at a group level, the average total profit was 718.7 in the public quality
treatment while it was 703 or less in all other treatments). Similar results are found in Table 8,
which shows the regression of total profits on treatment dummies. The public quality treatment
has an increase in total surplus of more than 30 points relative to the no-awards case and this
coefficient is statistically higher than those of the private and public award treatments. In the public
quality treatment, buyers can observe the actual suppliers’ quality choice in the first transaction,
as opposed to some imperfect signal (the award). This leads to higher prices and higher quality
benefitting both buyers and suppliers. This result is consistent with previous literature that shows
that clear signals of performance lead to higher efficiency. For example, Bolton et al. (2004) find
experimentally that while online feedback systems have positive effects on transaction efficiency
between strangers, they cannot fully capture the benefits of reputation building in markets where
the same people interact with each other repeatedly.
Finally, we note that total surplus, on average, is not significantly different in the no award and
private awards treatments (βPrA = 12.745 vs. βPuA = 14.242, p = 0.916). This is because due to
the incentive effects, in the private award treatment buyers’ profits increase and suppliers’ profits
decrease relative to the no awards treatment. Similarly, total profits are not statistically different
in the private and public awards treatments. This indicates that making the awards public results
in a transfer of profits from buyers back to the suppliers, and it is not a loss in efficiency.
7. Discussion
We study whether there are learning effects as subject play consecutive rounds in a session (with
random re-matching in between rounds). We note that most of our results regarding the incentive
and competition effects still hold if we consider only the last three rounds of play (each session
consisted in total of six rounds). Specifically, we find that the probability of receiving an award
increases when suppliers choose a quality level that is greater than or equal to the requested quality,
similarly to what happens when we consider all six rounds of play (Table 4). The second aspect
of the incentive effect –quality is higher in the treatments where awards are available than in the
15 We calculate total surplus across the two periods keeping the buyer fixed. That is if a buyer was matched with one
supplier in period one and with the other supplier in period two, we calculate total surplus as the sum of the buyer’s
profits in both periods plus the sum of the profits of each of the two suppliers in the respective period in which they
were matched with the buyer.
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no-awards case– is also present in the last three rounds of play. This is true despite the fact that
round has a significant negative effect on quality: as rounds go by in a session, overall quality
decreases. Noticeably, the crowding out effect in the public award treatment –quality is only higher
than in the no-awards treatment in period 1, but not in period 2– is also present when we consider
only the final three rounds of play. Finally, we also find that the competition effect –the price
premium in period 2 for suppliers who received an award in period 1 is higher in the public award
treatment than in the private award treatment, as shown in Table 6– gets even stronger when we
consider only the last three rounds of play (β[AwardxPrA] = 6.64 vs. β[AwardxPuA] = 24.46, difference:
p = 0.06). This confirms that most of our results are stable throughout a session and hold even
when we consider only the final rounds.
Our theoretical model assumes the existence of two types of suppliers, a “low-(motivational)
type” who has no intrinsic value for a symbolic award and a “high-(motivational) type” who draws
intrinsic value from winning a symbolic award. We study whether the experimental data provides
support for the existence of these two types of suppliers by observing the suppliers’ behavior in the
second period of the private award treatment (where effort exerted to receive an award has to be
attributed to an intrinsic value for the award, as concerns about reputation and future interactions
are not present). We would expect to find differences in how the two types of suppliers respond
to a buyer’s quality request (controlling for price): high-type suppliers choose higher quality when
the quality request is higher (to increase their chances of getting an award) and low-type suppliers
choose low quality regardless of the requested quality. Figure 5 in the Appendix shows scatter
plots of quality vs. requested quality at different price levels. We observe two distinctive patterns
in the data, the observations lined along the horizontal axis are consistent with low-type suppliers
while the observations that present positive correlation between quality and requested quality are
consistent with high-type suppliers. While this provides initial support for the existence of two
types of suppliers, these scatterplots do not allow to see whether these observations are attributed
to subjects consistently behaving according to one type or the other across the multiple rounds
played in a session. To test that, we select those subjects to played at least 3 rounds in the role
of suppliers where price was greater than or equal to 10 and we compute the fraction of times
they chose a quality greater than or equal to the buyer’s requested quality in those rounds. We
would expect to find heterogeneity in this metric, with low-type suppliers having a low fraction
and high-type suppliers having a higher fraction. Figure 6 in the Appendix shows a histogram of
this metric providing more support for the existence of two different supplier types.
Our results contribute to the discussion of where the value of symbolic awards stems from. Frey
and Neckermann (2008) identify several reasons why awards may have motivational effects: (1)
because they make the recipient feel good about about themselves, (2) because recipients value
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the opinion of the authority who gives out the award, (3) because awards generate social prestige
and bring recognition within the peer group, or (4) because some subjects enjoy competing for
an award. The first and second explanations are more salient in cases where the awards resemble
feedback or praise, as it is usually the case in supplier awards. If the supplier’s employees care about
their hard work being recognized by the firm’s clients, managers may seek to get these awards
to motivate their workers to provide higher effort. The third and fourth explanations are usually
associated with competition prizes. In line with this last group, some previous experiments find
that awards that are scarce generate status. In this case, the more visible the awards are, the larger
the motivational effect is. In practice, we observe that supplier awards are not easy to get but also
not particularly scarce. For example, in 2013 USPS granted seven supplier awards (in different
categories such as innovation, diversity, sustainability). In year 2014, Whole Foods Market gave
twenty supplier awards including best partnership, best new product, product quality, innovation,
etc. In our setting both suppliers may simultaneously get an award, thus there is no competition
for the award between suppliers. This may explain why in our setting, the experimental results
show that making the awards public, rather than increasing the value of the award, crowds out
their motivational value.
Some previous studies have found evidence of awards crowding out motivation. For example,
a few papers have shown that monetary awards can decrease intrinsic motivation. Lacetera and
Macis (2010a) find a substantial drop in blood donation if awards are given in form of small cash.
Similarly, Ariely et al. (2009) find that monetary incentives have no effects on efforts made in public
but they do increase efforts made in private. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find that in high-school
and university students performing a task, monetary incentives decrease intrinsic motivation if
awards are not sufficiently large. It is unclear in the previous literature whether, in the case of
symbolic awards, higher visibility (public awards) strengthens or crowds out intrinsic motivation
(relative to private awards). Charness et al. (2013) conduct an experiment where participants
perform a task and show that public symbolic awards (a medal for an out-performer or a donkey
hat for an under-performer) crowd out the positive effect of ranking feedback on performance. On
the other hand, Lacetera and Macis (2010b) and Ashraf et al. (2012) find that increased visibility
of a symbolic award allows for peer comparison and makes the award more valuable. In our setting,
a public award not only allows social comparison, but also works as a signal which grants the
recipient of the award a higher price in a subsequent period. Our experimental results show that
public awards are no longer valuable to suppliers in a second (and final) period, while private
awards are valuable in both periods. This suggests that public awards may be perceived by some
suppliers merely as a “tool” to get better contracts and as a result, publicizing the award crowds
out the intrinsic value of the award to suppliers.
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In addition to the above, another reason why suppliers may care about receiving the award is
that it indicates a higher probability of a continuing relationship. This explanation seems plausible;
our results show that when awards are available, receiving an award leads to a continuing offer
in 52% of the cases compared to only 18% when suppliers do not receive an award. However,
this argument is not sufficient to fully explain the outcomes we obtain from our experiment. In
the private award treatment, suppliers exert higher effort than in the no-award scenario not only
in the first transaction, but also un the second transaction. Concerns about the continuation of
the relationship fail to explain higher quality in the second (and final) transaction. A natural
path for future research would be to analyze the case of longer buyer-supplier relationships. Based
on previous literature, we conjecture that longer relationships (repeated interactions between the
firms) can lead to more collaborative and efficient outcomes. Analogous to the results in Beer et al.
(2017), this could potentially be attributed to highly motivational suppliers choosing higher quality
in expectation of future profits and awards, and to low motivational type suppliers mimicking high
type suppliers to get better price offers.
8. Conclusions
Our paper provides insights about how a buyer can incentivize suppliers to provide “above and
beyond” quality with a symbolic award. Our experiment shows that –when available– buyers give
out symbolic awards to those suppliers who meet or exceed their quality expectations. These
symbolic awards are valuable to some suppliers, who are thus incentivized to exert higher effort.
However, our study also shows that if a symbolic award for exceptional performance is highly
publicized, a symbolic award can be quite costly to a buyer. This happens in particular when all
buyers seek to transact with a few “good” suppliers. In contrast to the existing body of literature
which considers only the direct cost of awards, our theoretical results and ensuing experiments
explore lingering effects that an award has in a marketplace. When an award is public, an award
can trigger competition among buyers and increases the cost of transacting with a good supplier.
In addition, an award can even induce a “bad” supplier to behave nicely when doing so can
increase the transaction price. These adverse effects can potentially wipe out the gain from the
motivational effect. Our study suggests that, when good suppliers are scarce and suppliers cannot
change their capacity freely, awards that are informal and private can effectively motivate suppliers
while minimizing harmful effects associated with a symbolic award.
Subjects’ profits in our experiments confirm the previous results. In our experiment, buyers’
profits are higher with private awards than when awards are not available, which suggests that the
incentive effect has a positive impact on buyers’ profits. However when awards are instead public,
the profit premium buyers get in the private awards case is no longer present. This is because,
30 Beer, Ahn, and Leider: Incentive and Competition Effects of Supplier Awards
while public awards lead to higher prices for good suppliers, they do not result in higher provision
of quality. In fact, public awards “crowd out” the incentive effect of the award and hinder buyer’s
profit relative to the private awards case. Suppliers’ monetary profits, on the other hand, increase
in the public awards case relative to the private awards case. This suggests that by increasing
the visibility of the award, the monetary benefits derived from the incentive effect of the award
are transferred from the buyer to the supplier. Finally, total surplus is significantly higher (than
in the no-award case) only when awards are private and quality is public. While a public award
can be informative of the supplier’s type, this signal carries noise and requires certain level of
interpretation from the buyers. When the quality is public the information is clear, which reduces
the inefficiency derived from asymmetric information. As a result, average price and average quality
are higher in both periods making both buyers and suppliers better off.
Our results explain some of the current trends observed in the industry. While suppliers strive
to loudly announce their awards, buyers devise creative informal awards which, have the ability of
inducing incentive effects, but are also hard to publicize. Our results suggest that when contem-
plating ways of rewarding suppliers’ high efforts, expressing praise or gratitude in private – at a
private corporate event or in daily verbal or email communication – can go a long way.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: In the last stage of period 2, it is easy to see from equation (1) that q2 = 0 is
a dominant strategy when there is no award. Knowing this, a buyer maximizes its utility (equation
(2)) by offering p2 = 0. Considering this subgame outcome, the first period transaction is identical
as the second transaction. Each buyer makes an offer of p1 = 0 and any requested quality, and
suppliers choose q1 = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: First, let πik ∈ (0,1) be a buyer’s prior belief that its own supplier’s type is k,
k ∈ {h = high, l = low}. Analogously, let π−ik ∈ (0,1) be a buyer’s belief about the other supplier’s
type. At the end of period 1, the buyer updates its belief about its own supplier’s type based on
the observation of quality. Specifically, let π(i, k|q1) be the buyer’s updated belief about its own
supplier’s type after observing the quality level q1 from the supplier. The buyer cannot update
its prior about the other supplier’s type, π−ih = π, since both the supplier’s quality and award are
private.
We show that the following is a truth-telling equilibrium of the game, where the buyer gives the
supplier an award if and only if the supplier’s quality is greater or equal to the buyer’s requested
quality. The buyers’ initial beliefs are that each supplier is of high type with probability π and
of low type with probability (1− π). In the first transaction, buyers offer p1 = 0 and q̂1 =C−1(ϕ),
all low-type suppliers choose q1 = 0 and do not get the award, and all high-type suppliers choose
q1 = q̂1 and get the award. After the first transaction period, a buyer’s updated beliefs about its
own supplier’s type are π(i, h|q1 ≥ q̂1) = 1 and π(i, h|q1 < q̂1) = 0. Since buyers cannot see whether
the other supplier has received an award or not, buyers do not update their beliefs about the other
supplier’s type; the supplier is of high type with probability π and of low type with probability
(1− π). In the second transaction, buyers make a continuing offer to their own suppliers, all low-
type suppliers continue to choose q2 = 0 and do not get the award, and all high-type suppliers
choose q2 = q̂2 and receive the award.
Note that, a buyer whose supplier chose q1 = 0 in the first period cannot profit from making a
new offer to the other supplier, hence it makes an offer to the existing supplier. This is because if
the other supplier is high-type, the offer will be matched and the buyer does not close a deal with
the other supplier. Since it can only win if the other supplier is low-type, the buyer is indifferent
between switching and continuing with its own (low-type) supplier in equilibrium.
Under this equilibrium, if the buyer is initially matched with a high-type supplier, he earns
2αC−1(ϕ) after two periods. Otherwise, it earns zero profits after two periods.
We show that no one has an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. Consider first a low-type
supplier. In the second transaction he chooses q2 = 0 regardless of the offered price since he does
not derive any utility from the award. In the first transaction, if he chooses q1 = q̂1 he induces
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the buyer to believe that he is high-type, and if he chooses q1 = 0 he induces the buyer to believe
that he is low-type. However, in either case, the buyer makes an offer with p= 0. Thus, a low-type
supplier chooses q1 = 0 in transaction 1.




ϕ+ p2 −C(q2) if q2 ≥ q̂2
p2 −C(q2) otherwise.
There are two candidates for the optimal solution: q2 = 0 or q2 = q̂2. If the cost of getting
the award, C(q̂2) exceeds the surplus the supplier gets from the award, ϕ, the supplier chooses
q2 = 0 and does not get the award. Otherwise, he chooses q2 = q̂2 and gets the award. Thus, a
high-type supplier will choose q2 = q̂2 if and only if ϕ≥C(q̂2) or equivalently, q̂2 ≤C−1(ϕ). Under
the truth-telling equilibrium, the requested quality is q̂2 = C
−1(ϕ), therefore a high-type supplier
(weakly) prefers getting the award with some efforts to not getting the award at all. Now consider
the first transaction period. If a high-type supplier chooses q1 = 0, the buyer will believe he is of
low type. On the other hand, if q1 = q̂1, the buyer will believe that he is of high type. Since the
buyer’s price in the second period is not affected by the buyer’s belief about the supplier’s type
(the buyer continues to offer p2 = 0 regardless of its updated beliefs), the supplier faces the same
decision problem as he faced in period 2. Thus, in the first transaction period, a high-type supplier
chooses q1 = q̂1 = C
−1(ϕ) and gets the award. As a result, the high-type supplier derives utility
ϕ−C(C−1(ϕ)) = 0 in both periods in equilibrium since the buyer sets the requested quality at a
level that extracts all the supplier’s surplus.
Finally, consider a buyer’s incentives to deviate from the truth-telling equilibrium. In equilibrium,
both buyers offer p1 = 0 and q̂1 = C
−1(ϕ) in the first transaction period, and make a continuing
offer to their own supplier in the next period.
Suppose that a buyer (say buyer 1) believes that its supplier is of low type at the beginning of
period 2. If the offer in period 1 was p1 = 0, making a continuing offer is a (weakly) dominating
strategy. If p1 was not zero, making a new zero-price offer to its own supplier is a (weakly) dominat-
ing strategy. To see why, note that if buyer 1 chooses to make a new offer to its own supplier (who
is believed to be a low-type), buyer 1 can earn at most zero. Now suppose that buyer 1 switches
and makes an offer to the other supplier – whom it believes to be a high-type with probability π
and a low-type with probability (1− π). If the other supplier is of high type, it must be the case
that the other buyer (buyer 2) received q1 = q̂1 in the first period. In our truth-telling equilibrium,
buyer 2 will make a continuing offer with a matching option. Hence, any offer that is made by the
buyer will be matched by buyer 2. The supplier stays with the incumbent buyer if the offers from
both buyers are the same. Thus, if buyer 1 makes an offer to the other supplier, it will win the
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deal only with a low-type supplier who will exert no effort. Consequently, buyer 1 does not gain
by switching.
Consider now buyer 1 who believes its own supplier is a high-type. If p1 = 0, it is (weakly)
dominant to make a continuing offer. If p1 > 0, he makes a new offer to its own supplier with
p2 = 0, since in equilibrium the other buyer makes a continuing offer to its own supplier and will
not attempt to “steal away”. Rolling back to the first period, making an offer with p1 = 0 and
q̂1 =C
−1(ϕ) grants buyer 1 the maximum profit. As before, it is never profitable to switch suppliers.
The argument for buyer 2 is symmetric. Summarizing all cases, a buyer earns 2αC−1(ϕ) when
it is matched with a high-type supplier, but earns zero if matched with a low-type.
We next show that this equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion. We show the following holds
for our truth-telling equilibrium: For any belief an uninformed player may have after seeing a
deviation, if one type of supplier has a worse payoff by deviating than her equilibrium payoff and
the other does not, then the deviation is not attributed to the supplier whose payoff decreases.
In our equilibrium, a low-type supplier chooses q1 = 0 and a high-type supplier chooses q1 = q̂1 =
C−1(ϕ). Two possible deviations from the equilibrium exist: 0< q1 < q̂1 and q1 > q̂1.
Consider first the buyer’s belief about a supplier who chooses q1 such that 0 < q1 < q̂1. This
supplier will not receive an award for his effort (recall that the buyer only gives an award if q1 ≥ q̂1).
If the supplier is a low-type, his payoff is −C(q1), making him worse off than the equilibrium
payoff, 0. Now consider a high-type supplier. The maximum he can derive from the deviation is
−C(q1) + ϕ−C(q̂2) < 0. Since any q1 in 0 < q1 < q̂1 results in a payoff that is dominated by the
equilibrium payoff for both types of supplier, the equilibrium does not violate the intuitive criterion.
Consider a deviation of q1 > q̂1. Since a low-type supplier does not derive any utility from a
symbolic award, and the price in the second period is zero regardless of the supplier’s choice of
quality, the maximum payoff the low-type supplier can earn is −C(q1). A high-type supplier earns
at most −C(q1)−C(q2) + 2ϕ < 0 with this deviation. Hence, all suppliers are worse off from this
deviation and the equilibrium does not violate the intuitive criterion.
Proof of Lemma 3: First, let us define π(−i, k|A1) as the buyer’s updated belief that the other
supplier is a high-type supplier after period 1. Let p̄ be the maximum price at which the buyer
earns non-negative profits in the second period when the requested quality is q̂2 = C
−1(ϕ). Since
the supplier’s optimal quality is either q2 = 0 or q2 = q̂2, then p̄= αC
−1(ϕ).
We show that the equilibrium described in Lemma 3 exists by showing that none of the players
wants to deviate. In this equilibrium, a buyer updates the belief about the other supplier’s type as
follows: π(−i, h|A1 = 1) = 1 and π(−i, h|A1 = 0) = 0.
Consider a high-type supplier’s incentive to deviate. In period 2, a high-type supplier chooses
q2 = q̂2 if and only if q̂2 ≤C−1(ϕ). Since this holds in equilibrium, he chooses q2 = q̂2. In transaction
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1, requested quality is q̂1 = C
−1(ϕ+ (1− π)p̄). If he chooses q1 = q̂1 and receives an award in the
first period, both buyers will update their beliefs. Then, if the other supplier is of low type (with
probability 1−π), he will be offered p2 = p̄. If the other supplier is also of high type, p2 = 0 is offered.
This results in an expected utility of ϕ−C(C−1(ϕ+ (1− π)p̄)) + (1− π)p̄+ϕ−C(C−1(ϕ)) = 0. If
the high-type supplier chooses q1 = 0, his action induces the buyer to believe that he is of low type
and this results zero utility in both periods. If he chooses any q1 > 0 different from q̂1, this will
result in a strictly negative utility. Thus, choosing q1 = q̂1 is a (weakly) dominating strategy.
Consider now a low-type supplier. In period 2, it is always optimal for a low-type supplier to
choose q2 = 0. In the first transaction, a low-type supplier could potentially have incentive to mimic
the high-type supplier and choose q1 = q̂1 so that the buyer believes he is of high type. However,
this is never optimal since it results in an expected profit of [(1−π)p̄]−C(C−1(ϕ+(1−π)p̄))< 0.
Choosing q1 = 0 results in zero expected profit and choosing any q1 > 0 and different from q̂1 results
in strictly negative expected profit. Thus, choosing q1 = 0 is a dominant strategy.
Finally, consider a buyer’s incentives to deviate from the equilibrium. In the second transaction,
if the buyer believes that both suppliers are of high type, making a new offer to its own supplier
with p2 = 0 and q̂2 =C
−1(ϕ) is a dominant strategy since this will result in the expected profit of
αC−1(ϕ+ (1− π)p̄) + αC−1(ϕ). If a buyer believes that both suppliers are of low type, it makes
a continuing offer (p2 = 0) and earns zero profits. No other offer would result in a positive buyer
profit.
If the buyer believes that its own supplier is of low type and the other supplier is of high type,
the buyer offers the high-type supplier p̄ = αq̂2 with a request q̂2 = min{C−1(ϕ),C ′−1(α)}. The
supplier, who received an identical offer from the other buyer, rejects this buyer’s offer. Thus, the
buyer ends up making a p2 = 0 offer to its own low-type supplier. In this case, both buyers earn zero
profits in period 2. Note that there is no equilibrium where a buyer earns positive profits in this
case and, therefore, no buyer has incentive to deviate from equilibrium and make a different offer.
This is because if one buyer’s offer to the high-type supplier earned the buyer positive profits, the
other buyer would have incentive to deviate and undercut the offer to steal the deal. While several
equilibria where the buyers earn zero profits could arise, the one that we characterize maximizes
the supplier’s profit in period 2. To see why, recall from a previous result that if q̂2 ≤C−1(ϕ) the
supplier chooses q2 = q̂2 and if q̂2 >C
−1(ϕ) the supplier chooses q2 = 0. Therefore, if q̂2 >C
−1(ϕ),
the buyer’s offer has p̄= 0 and the supplier earns zero profit. On the other hand, if q̂2 ≤C−1(ϕ) the
supplier’s profit is maximized at q∗2 =C
′−1(α) if C ′−1(α)≤C−1(ϕ) and at q∗2 =C−1(ϕ) otherwise. As
a result, an equilibrium where the buyer offers p̄= αq̂2 with a request q̂2 =min{C−1(ϕ),C ′−1(α)}
has zero buyer profit and maximizes the supplier’s profit.
Beer, Ahn, and Leider: Incentive and Competition Effects of Supplier Awards 35
Rolling back to the first transaction, any price greater than zero is dominated by p1 = 0, as p1
does not affect the suppliers’ actions. Requested quality q̂1 = C
−1(ϕ+ (1− π)p̄) makes the high
type supplier indifferent between choosing q= q̂ and q1 = 0 and is therefore, the maximum quality
the buyer can get in transaction 1.
This equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion since for both supplier types, the payoffs from
deviation are dominated by the equilibrium payoffs (considering again the two possible deviations,
0< q1 < q̂1 and q1 > q̂1). The proof is similar to that used in 2.
Proof of Lemma 4:
In truth-telling equilibria, a buyer gives the supplier an award when the supplier chooses qt ≥ q̂t.
The equilibrium outcomes of the scenario with public quality and private award are equivalent
to those in the scenario with public award and private quality. The only difference between the
two settings is that when quality is public (and the award is not), buyers update their beliefs
about the other supplier’s type based on the quality he chose, π(−i, k|q1), instead of updating their
beliefs based on whether the supplier received an award or not, π(−i, k|A1). If the supplier chose a
quality greater or equal to the requested quality, the buyer believes the supplier is a high type and
otherwise it believes the supplier is a low type (i.e. π(−i, h|q1 ≥ q̂1) = 1 and π(−i, h|q1 < q̂1) = 0).
Note that in equilibrium, if a supplier chooses qi ≥ q̂i, he receives an award and otherwise he does
not receive an award. Thus, observing whether the supplier receives an award or not is equivalent
to observing whether qi ≥ q̂i, and the analysis of the two cases is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) The result follows from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 which show that a
buyer’s expected profit in the no-award case is 0, while it is π2αC−1(ϕ)> 0 in the private award
case and π[αC−1(ϕ+(1−π)αC−1(ϕ))+παC−1(ϕ)]> 0 in the public award case. (ii) From the proof
of Lemma 2, a buyer’s expected profit in the private award case is π2αC−1(ϕ). From the proof of
Lemma 3, a buyer’s expected profit in the public awards case is π[αC−1(ϕ+ (1− π)αC−1(ϕ)) +
παC−1(ϕ)]. Therefore, buyers’ expected profits are higher when awards are private than when
awards are public if 2αC−1(ϕ)>αC−1(ϕ+(1−π)αC−1(ϕ))+παC−1(ϕ), or equivalently, if ∆(ϕ) =
(2− π)C−1(ϕ)−C−1(ϕ+ (1− π)αC−1(ϕ)) > 0. For fixed values of α and π, this condition holds
for a sufficiently high value of ϕ. To see why, note that taking first derivative with respect to ϕ of







C′(C−1(ϕ+(1−π)αC−1(ϕ)) . Since C(·)









> 0. (iii) The result follows from Lemma 4 which shows
that the equilibrium outcomes of the scenario with public quality and private award are equivalent
to those in the scenario with public award and private quality.
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Estimation of the Symbolic Award’s Intrinsic Value (ϕ parameter) In order to capture a
supplier’s value for the award, we estimate how much more likely a supplier is to choose a quality
level that increases his chance of receiving an award (Model 1). In addition, since in section 6.2.1 we
show that a supplier’s chance of receiving an award increases significantly when a supplier matches
the buyer’s requested quality, we also consider a model that estimates a supplier’s utility from
fulfilling the buyer’s request (Model 2). We consider only the PrA treatment, since this treatment
isolates the incentive effect from the competition effect.




C(qt) + ϕAt], where At is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the supplier gets the award
in period t. Note that a supplier’s quality choice not only affects his monetary payoff, but it also
affects his chances of receiving an award. In each period t, we can estimate the probability that
supplier i will receive an award, conditional on the quality chosen and the buyer’s requested quality,
as Pr(Ai,t|qi,t, q̂i,t) = α0 +α1qi,t +α2q̂i,t + εij.
In each period t, conditional on accepting an offer, a supplier has several choices of quality level,
qi,t,j with j ∈ {0,1,2, ....,10} so that the total number of alternatives to choose from is J = 11.
We can empirically estimate the parameters of the following logit model for supplier i’s utility in
period t from choosing quality alternative j conditional on the buyer’s requested quality and price:
Ui,t(qi,t,j|q̂i,t, pi,t) = β$[pi,t −C(qi,t,j)]+ϕ[Pr(Ai,t|qi,t,j, q̂i,t)]+ εi,t,j
The parameter β$ affecting the first term in this model is the supplier’s concern for his monetary
payoff while the parameter ϕ affecting the second term is the supplier’s concern for choosing an
alternative that increases his chances of receiving an award. Higher quality increases a supplier’s
chances of receiving an award but is also more costly. The supplier’s quality decision is therefore a
trade-off between increasing his chance of getting an award (valued with a weight ϕ) and maximizing
his monetary payoff (valued with a weight β$). We estimate the parameters in this model, where
ϕ
β$
captures the value of the award in monetary terms. The probability that supplier i chooses quality
alternative j in period t is given by:






where yi,t,k is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if alternative k = j corresponds with the
quality level actually chosen by supplier i in period t, and zero otherwise. Z ′i,t,k is a vector consisting
of the monetary payoff and the probability of getting the award, and β is the vector of parameters
[β$, ϕ]. Based on this formulation, the likelihood function can be derived and maximized to obtain
the vector β by maximum likelihood estimation.
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 9. The variable “Monetary Payoff” is com-
puted for each observation and quality alternative as price−C(alternative). In Model 1 “Award
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Probability” is the probability of getting an award for a given quality alternative conditional on
requested quality. Since a supplier’s chance of receiving an award is close to 100% when quality is
equal to the requested quality, the alternatives that exceed the requested quality are strictly dom-
inated by the alternative that is equal to the requested quality. To account for this, we truncated
the “Award Probability” variable by setting the probability of getting an award equal to zero for
all the alternatives greater than the requested quality. In Model 2 “Award Probability” is a dummy
variable which takes value 1 when the alternative is equal to the requested quality level and zero
otherwise.
Table 9 Estimation of Intrinsic Value of the Award
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficients Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Monetary Payoff 0.079*** 0.100*** 0.073*** 0.080***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Award Probability 2.196*** 3.831*** 1.740*** 1.324***
(0.292) (0.584) (0.245) (0.250)
Observations 990 1067 990 1067
Nr. of Subjects 90 97 90 97
Dollar value of a 100% increase
in award probability [0.05ϕ
β
] 1.39 1.92 1.19 0.83
% of average payment/round 36 49 31 21
Conditional Logistic Model. Data corresponding to the private award (PrA) treatment. Significance is denoted: *
p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table 10 Award Criterion
Treatment # of rounds where # of rounds where Quality in rounds Quality in rounds
awards were given awards were not given where award was given where award was not given
Period 1 PrA 38 52 3.868 1.962
PuA 43 34 3.464 2.306
Period 2 PrA 35 62 3.629 1.839
PuA 34 50 3.647 1.320
Number of rounds and averages are conditional on acceptance of the buyer’s offer.
Figure 4 Award Screenshot
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Nr. of Subjects 75
OLS regression with subject random effects and standard errors clustered at the session level. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. The data includes PrA and PuA
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Fehr, Ernst, Simon Gächter. 2000. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American
Economic Review 980–994.
Fischbacher, U. 2007. z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics
10(2) 171–178.
Frey, Bruno S, Susanne Neckermann. 2008. Awards. Zeitschrift für Psychologie/Journal of Psychology 216(4)
198–208.
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